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Abstract
Governments are increasingly adopting behavioral science techniques for changing individual behavior in
pursuit of policy objectives. The types of “nudge” interventions that governments are now adopting alter
people’s decisions without coercion or significant changes to economic incentives. We calculated ratios
of impact to cost for nudge interventions and for traditional policy tools, such as tax incentives and other
financial inducements, and we found that nudge interventions often compare favorably with traditional
interventions. We conclude that nudging is a valuable approach that should be used more often in
conjunction with traditional policies, but more calculations are needed to determine the relative
effectiveness of nudging.
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Abstract
Governments are increasingly adopting behavioral science techniques for changing individual
behavior in pursuit of policy objectives. The types of “nudge” interventions that governments are
now adopting alter people’s decisions without resorting to coercion or significant changes to
economic incentives. We calculate ratios of impact to cost for nudge interventions and for
traditional policy tools, such as tax incentives and other financial inducements, and we find that
nudge interventions often compare favorably to traditional interventions. We conclude that
nudging is a valuable approach that should be used more in conjunction with traditional policies,
but more relative effectiveness calculations are needed.

Keywords: nudge, nudge unit, choice architecture, behavioral science, behavioral
economics, savings, pension plan, education, college enrollment, energy, electricity usage,
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Introduction
Recent evidence indicates that the burgeoning field of behavioral science can help solve a
wide range of policy problems (Halpern, 2015; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Johnson et al., 2012;
Larrick & Soll, 2008; Ly, Mazar, Zhao, & Soman, 2013; Sunstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein,
2008; World Bank, 2015). In response, governments are increasingly interested in using
behavioral insights as a supplement to or replacement for traditional economic levers, such as
incentives, to shape the behavior of citizens and government personnel to promote public
priorities. A number of governments around the world have formed “nudge units”: teams of
behavioral science experts tasked with designing behavioral interventions with the potential to
encourage desirable behavior without restricting choice, testing those interventions rapidly and
inexpensively, and then widely implementing the strategies that prove most effective. The United
Kingdom established a nudge unit in 2010 and was soon followed by other countries, including
Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore as well as the United States, where an
Executive Order issued in September 2015 directed federal agencies to incorporate behavioral
science into their programs (Obama, 2015). Of course, it is important to emphasize that
behaviorally informed approaches can also be implemented by agencies without the use of
designated nudge units.
A key feature of behavioral strategies is that they aim to change “people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, [an]…intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.
Nudges are not mandates” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudges do not impose material costs but
instead alter the underlying “choice architecture,” for example by changing the default option to
take advantage of people’s tendency to accept defaults passively. Nudges stand in contrast to
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traditional policy tools, which change behavior with mandates or bans or through economic
incentives (including significant subsidies or fines).
For example, a behaviorally informed policy intervention might automatically enroll
people in programs designed to reduce poverty (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2013),
eliminate or reduce paperwork requirements for obtaining licenses or permits, or streamline the
process of applying for government financial aid for college attendance (Bettinger, Long,
Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 2012). Many nudges have this general form; they simplify
processes to make benefits more readily available. As governments decide on the appropriate
resources to invest in nudge policies, an important question is how efficiently nudge initiatives
achieve their objectives. A nudge policy that increases engagement in a desired behavior (e.g.,
college attendance) by a larger amount per dollar spent than a traditional intervention would be
an attractive investment of public resources.
This point may seem obvious, and some nudges do produce self-evidently large
behavioral changes (Benartzi and Thaler, 2013). But because extremely cost-effective nudges do
not always create large absolute shifts in behavior, scholars and policy makers may
underappreciate their value in the absence of cost-effectiveness calculations. As a motivating
case study for assessing the cost effectiveness (rather than merely the effectiveness) of nudge
policies, consider an experiment conducted by the White House Social and Behavioral Sciences
Team (SBST)—the U.S. nudge unit—in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD).
This experiment sought to increase savings among military personnel in the defined
contribution retirement plan offered to federal government employees, a setting where the
government already offers monetary incentives for saving (retirement plan contributions are tax-
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deductible). In the experiment, 806,861 military service members who were not contributing to
the plan received emails nudging them to begin contributing (except for a control group, which
received no email—the business-as-usual practice). The emails were experimentally varied to
test different behaviorally-informed strategies for increasing sign-ups (see SOM-U for further
information on the experiment and its results). The business-as-usual control group had a 1.1%
savings plan enrollment rate over the month following the messaging campaign, while the groups
who received emails had enrollment rates ranging from 1.6% to 2.1%.
At first blush, this campaign’s impact seems modest. However, the incremental
administrative costs of developing and deploying the email campaign were just $5,000, and the
messages collectively increased savings plan enrollment by roughly 5,200 people and increased
contributions by more than $1.3 million in just the first month post-experiment.1 If we
extrapolate and assume that the intervention’s effect decays linearly to zero over one year (a
highly conservative assumption given the stickiness of savings plan contributions), the program
increased savings by approximately $8 million total. Thus, the intervention generated $1,600 in
additional savings per dollar spent by the government, an impact that is more than one hundred
times larger than the impact per dollar spent by the government on tax incentives, as we calculate
later in this paper. This case study demonstrates that nudge policies do not need to produce a
large impact in absolute terms to be effective.

1

This estimate is relative to our estimate of what would have happened had everyone been in the control group. To
estimate the overall effect of the email campaign on enrollment, we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
with an indicator for enrollment as the outcome variable and with only a constant and an indicator variable for
receiving an email as the explanatory variables. Multiplying the point estimate (and the endpoints of the 95%
confidence interval) for the coefficient on the email indicator variable by the number of individuals who received
emails, we estimate that the email campaign increased savings program enrollment by 5,265 people (95% CI: 4,5635,968). Using the same methodology, we also estimate that the email campaign increased total contributions to
retirement accounts in the month following the email campaign by $1,367,423. Note that this last calculation
excludes Marines and is therefore an understatement of the effect.
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Past studies on nudges, including those disseminated by existing nudge units, have
typically measured only the extent to which an intended behavior was changed (if at all). To be
maximally informative, future policy-oriented behavioral science research should measure the
impact per dollar spent on behavioral interventions in comparison to more traditional
interventions. In the absence of such calculations, policymakers lack the evidence needed to
design optimal policies and to decide on the appropriate allocation of resources across
behaviorally-informed and traditional interventions.
Method
Study Selection Criteria
We formed a list of policy areas by combining the focus areas from the 2015 summary
reports of the U.S. and U.K. nudge units (Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, 2015;
Behavioural Insights Team, 2015), eliminating redundancies and excluding areas that are not
major domestic policy foci for the U.S. government. Within each category, we identified one
well-defined behavior to be our outcome variable of interest. The SOM-R details our selection
methodology. In short, when a policy area had an obvious behavior to focus on, the choice was
simple (e.g., in “Energy,” we focus on energy consumption). When there was no obvious target,
we looked to the outcome variable emphasized by the SBST. If the policy area was not studied
by SBST, we looked to the outcome variable emphasized by the BIT. Table 1 displays the SBST
and BIT policy areas of focus, our categorization of these areas, areas that were excluded, and
outcomes variables of interest.
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Table 1.
Categorization of all focus areas listed in the SBST 2015 Annual Report and the BIT 2013-2015
Update Report and corresponding outcome variables.
Our
Categorization
Financial
Security in
Retirement
Education

Energy
Health

Job Training

Program
Integrity &
Compliance
Home Affairs

Corresponding Focus
Area(s) in SBST 2015
Annual Report
Promoting Retirement
Security

Corresponding Focus
Area(s) in BIT 2013-2015
Update Report
Empowering Consumersa

Outcome Variable of Interest

Improving College
Access &
Affordability
n/a
Helping Families Get
Health Coverage &
Stay Healthy
Advancing Economic
Opportunity

Education

College enrollment among
recent high school graduates

Energy & Sustainability
Health & Wellbeing

Energy consumption
Adult outpatient influenza
vaccinations

Economic Growth & the
Labour Market
Skills & Youth
Fraud, Error & Debtb

Enrollment in job training
programsc

Promoting Program
Integrity &
Compliance
n/a

Retirement savings

Compliance with paying a
required fee to the governmentc

Home Affairs

Reducing crimes such as illegal
migration, mobile phone theft,
and online exploitationc
Note: Our list excludes the following SBST and BIT focus areas because they are not major areas of
domestic policy for the U.S. government: Ensuring Cost-Effective Program Operations (SBST), Giving &
Social Action (BIT), International Development (BIT), and Work with Other Governments (BIT).
a
We group this focus area with SBST’s Promoting Retirement Security area because its leading example
has to do with pensions.
b
We group this focus area with SBST’s Promoting Program Integrity & Compliance area because both
focus on improving tax and fee collection.
c
In “Job Training,” “Program Integrity & Compliance,” and “Home Affairs,” the targeted behaviors were
not studied in published research papers in leading academic journals from 2000 to mid-2015 (see below
for an explanation of our journal selection criteria), so we exclude these areas from our analysis.

We next searched leading academic journals for original research, published from 2000
to mid-2015, studying interventions aimed at directly influencing outcome variables of interest.
Using Google Scholar to determine academic journal rankings,2 we limited our set of academic
journals to Google Scholar’s three leading general interest journals (Science, Nature, and

2

Top Publications. (September 29, 2015). Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=top_venues
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences); three leading economics journals, excluding
finance journals (American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of
Economics and Statistics); three leading psychology journals, excluding journals that publish
only review articles (Psychological Science, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and
Journal of Applied Psychology); and, in the case of Health, three leading general medical
journals (New England Journal of Medicine, Lancet, and Journal of the American Medical
Association).
Criteria for inclusion in our analyses were: the entire research paper was available online;
the paper analyzed a (i) nudge, (ii) tax incentive, (iii) reward, or (iv) educational program
targeting one of the dependent variables of interest; and the paper presented the necessary
information to construct relative effectiveness calculations, or we could obtain this information
by contacting the author(s). (Note that reminders and streamlined or salient disclosure policies
can qualify as nudges, but for present purposes, we do not count traditional educational programs
as such.) If our search for papers studying a given outcome variable did not identify a paper that
met our inclusion criteria, we dropped that outcome variable from our analysis. If our search for
papers studying a given outcome variable identified papers that met our inclusion criteria and
that covered some but not all of the four intervention types above, we attempted to fill the gaps
by widening our search.
Our method for choosing dependent variables for inclusion in our relative effectiveness
analysis ensured the selection of outcomes for which the ex ante belief of policy makers was that
nudges had a chance to impact behavior. This method likely gave an advantage to nudges over
incentives and educational interventions in our relative effectiveness calculations. However, it
may be appropriate to confer this advantage if policy makers are indeed selective in applying

SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INVEST MORE IN NUDGING?

9

nudges where they have a high potential for impact. Furthermore, we are careful to focus only on
settings of major domestic policy interest,3 making our findings highly policy-relevant regardless
of any selection concerns.4
Relative Effectiveness Calculations
We offer a comparison between the effectiveness of behaviorally-motivated policies and
the effectiveness of standard policies by using a single measure that takes both the cost of a
program and its impact into account. Specifically, we examine the ratio between an
intervention’s causal effect on a given outcome variable and its (inflation-adjusted)
implementation cost.5
Our definition of the impact of an intervention follows from the main findings of the
paper reporting on it. When a paper studies the effect of an intervention on multiple outcome
variables or target populations, we select the outcome and target population that are most
comparable to the outcomes and target populations studied in other papers on the same topic.6
We often need to make additional assumptions to produce intervention cost estimates. Some
interventions affect an outcome by increasing take-up of another program that affects the
outcome.7 One may argue that in these situations, interventions have additional, indirect costs

3

See, for example, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017. (September 13, 2016). Retrieved
from https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview
4
Another potential concern is that our process for selecting research papers might be likely to identify false-positive
results. We have conducted p-curve analyses for the key results identified by our process. The collection of results
concerning nudge interventions has evidential value, as does the collection of results concerning traditional
interventions. See the SOM-U.
5
We adjust all costs to June 2015 levels using the annual CPI from the year of intervention. For multi-year
interventions, we adjust using the midpoint year.
6
For example, Bettinger et al. (2012) study the effect of Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA)
assistance on FAFSA completion rates, college attendance rates, Pell Grant receipt rates, and years of postsecondary
education for both traditional and non-traditional students. We focus on the effect on college attendance rates among
traditional students for comparability with other studies.
7
For example, Bettinger et al. (2012) provided assistance in completing the FAFSA to increase college enrollment
through improved access to financial aid. Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011) and Chapman, Li,
Colby, and Yoon (2010) used nudges to encourage take-up of flu shots during free vaccination campaigns.
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because they increase the use of other programs. However, in most of cases we study, the
intervention simply encourages use of existing, under-capacity institutions in a way that better
fulfills those institutions’ missions. Some interventions may create perverse outcomes that are
costly, and in those situations, we explicitly account for those costs.8 That said, we do not
include any indirect costs that result from increases in the intended use of other, existing
institutions.
In most cases, the different interventions we study within a domain operate over similar
time horizons. We evaluate retirement savings interventions over a horizon of one year.
Similarly, college education interventions are measured in terms of their impact on annual
enrollment, and influenza vaccination interventions operate over the course of a single year’s
vaccination cycle (approximately September through December). In contrast, results from energy
conservation interventions are reported for time horizons ranging from a few months to several
years, and we note these differences when discussing energy conservation calculations.
However, even in the case of energy conservation interventions, our relative effectiveness
calculations provide useful guidance to policy makers who apply a low intertemporal discount
rate to future financial costs and energy savings.
Some experimental studies have multiple treatment arms, and experimenters incur
research costs (e.g., data collection costs, participant payments) for all study arms, including the
control group. Treatment effects are estimated based on the marginal increase in the outcome
variable in the treatment group over the control group, and we calculate intervention costs in the
same way: as the marginal cost of the treatment over the cost of the control. We further focus our

8

An instance of a costly side effect occurs with the Chapman et al. (2010) implementation of an opt-out vaccination
appointment system, which increased no-shows at the vaccination clinic.
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attention on capturing the primary costs for each intervention, and we omit the costs of any
minor unreported aspects of the program.9
Of course, relative effectiveness calculations do not address the question of whether
increasing the behavior in question is socially beneficial. Our approach is to take stated
government goals as given and then to address how best those goals can be achieved.
Results
We now describe the results of our relative effectiveness calculations, summarized in
Table 2 and Figure 1. Except where noted, monetary amounts are reported in 2015 dollars.
Readers interested in additional details should consult the SOM-U.
Increasing Retirement Savings
Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) studied an active decision nudge for
retirement savings. A company’s new employees were required to indicate their preferred
contribution rate in a workplace savings plan within their first month of employment. Compared
to an enrollment system that asked employees to choose a contribution rate on their own and that
implemented a default contribution rate of zero for employees who had not chosen another rate,
the active decision nudge increased the average contribution rate in the first year of employment
by more than one percent of pay. The nudge is effective because it ensures that procrastination
will not prevent new employees from signing up for the plan (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2001).
We conservatively apply the one percentage point average contribution rate increase to an
annual salary of $20,000 (well below these employees’ median income), for a contribution

9
This may lead us to account for a category of cost in one setting but not in another. For example,
administrative/marketing costs for a purely informational intervention may be the most significant costs of the
intervention, and we would therefore include them in our cost accounting. However, for grant programs or tax
credits, administrative/marketing costs are small compared to the total amount of money transferred, so accounting
for them would not significantly affect our estimates. Thus, we do not explicitly incorporate such costs.
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increase of $200 per employee. We estimate that the cost of including the savings plan
enrollment form in the information packet for new hires and following up with the 5% of
employees who failed to return the form was approximately $2 per employee, so the active
decision nudge generated $100 of additional savings per dollar spent.
Perhaps the best-known nudge for promoting savings in workplace retirement accounts is
to enroll employees automatically and/or to use automatic escalation to increase their
contribution rates. Automatic enrollment is effective because people exhibit inertia, which favors
sticking to defaults; because people infer that policy makers are recommending the default
option; and because defaults become reference points, making deviations from the default feel
like losses, which loom larger than gains (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The most definitive study
of savings plan automatic enrollment uses data from Denmark (Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen,
Nielsen, & Olsen, 2014). Changing the fraction of an individual’s salary that is automatically
directed to a retirement account can generate savings changes of several percentage points of
annual salary at essentially zero cost if the infrastructure for payroll deduction into a retirement
account already exists.10 By contrast, the same paper studies a reduction in the tax deduction
available for contributions to a particular type of retirement account, showing that this traditional
policy change reduced contributions by 2,449 DKr, or $540 in U.S. dollars, and increased
government revenues by 883 DKr, or $195 in U.S. dollars, for each person affected by the
change, implying the tax deduction generated only $2.77 of additional savings in this type of
account per dollar of government expenditure.11
10

Madrian and Shea (2001) and Card and Ransom (2011) study automatic enrollment and related nudges and find
similar results.
11
We convert Danish kroner to U.S. dollars using the 6.5-to-1 exchange rate preferred by Chetty et al. (2014), and
we then adjust from 1999 to 2015 price levels. Chetty et al. (2014) also study the extent to which savings increases
in a retirement account caused by changes to automatic contributions or caused by changes to tax incentives are
offset by savings decreases in an individual’s other financial accounts. The offset is minor in the case of changes to
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Duflo and Saez (2003) tested a (traditional) educational intervention, offering a
university’s employees $20 to attend a benefits fair to receive information about their retirement
savings plan. This intervention increased plan contributions over the next year by $58.95 at a
cost of $4.04 per employee, generating $14.58 in additional contributions in the year per dollar
spent.12
Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez (2006) provided clients of a tax-preparation
company matching contributions for deposits to a retirement savings account. Clients who were
offered a 20% [50%] match contributed $76.9 [$162.1] more to the account relative to the
control group and received average matching contributions of $16.7 [$82.4], for total
incremental contributions of $93.6 [$244.5] per treated client, and a mere $5.59 [$2.97] in total
contributions per dollar of matching expenditures.
Duflo et al. (2006) also calculated the effect of tax credits on retirement account
contributions, but we focus on the results from a companion paper (Duflo, Gale, Liebman,
Orszag, & Saez, 2007) devoted specifically to studying these tax credits. The authors estimate
that an increase in the tax credit from 20% to 50% of contributions generates an additional $11.6
of deposits to a retirement account, from an average of $12.0 to $23.5. This increase translates to
just $11.6/(0.5*23.5–0.2*12.0)=$1.24 of retirement savings per dollar of tax credits.
Increasing College Enrollment among Recent High School Graduates
When H&R Block tax professionals facilitated the process of filing the Free Application
for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) for their clients, high school seniors whose families received

automatic contributions. However, when savings in a retirement account respond to changes to tax incentives for the
account, this response is almost completely offset by adjustments in other accounts. The other papers that we
analyze do not report results regarding the extent of such offsetting because the data are not available.
12
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011) analyze a similar intervention but do not find a statistically significant impact,
so the Duflo and Saez (2003) results are potentially overly optimistic.
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the assistance were 8.1 percentage points more likely to attend college the following year. The
incremental cost of this nudge intervention over the control group was $53.02 per participant.
Thus, it produced 1.53 additional college enrollees per thousand dollars spent (Bettinger et al.,
2012). This streamlined personalized assistance nudge likely reduced procrastination by making
the FAFSA easier to complete, alleviating anxiety about making errors, reducing the stigma for
low socioeconomic status individuals associated with filling out the FAFSA, and increasing the
salience and perceived value of completing it. When this nudge was replaced with a more
traditional educational intervention providing families with details about their aid eligibility,
there was a statistically insignificant decrease in college enrollment relative to the untreated
control group (Bettinger et al., 2012).
Turning to monetary incentives, Dynarski (2003) estimated the effect of the Social
Security Student Benefit Program, a federal subsidy for post-secondary education, on college
enrollment. The elimination of benefit eligibility reduced attendance rates for affected students
by 18.2 percentage points.13 The average annual subsidy for each student in 1980 was $9,252,
and 56% of the eligible group attended college for a cost per eligible individual of $5,181. The
program therefore generated 0.182/5,181*1,000=0.0351 additional college enrollees per
thousand dollars spent.14 This impact per thousand dollars spent is approximately 40 times
smaller than the corresponding impact of the Bettinger et al. (2012) nudge.
Long (2004a) studied state higher education subsidies for enrollment in public
universities. Long’s estimates indicate that in the absence of any state support, 5,535 students in

13

This study evaluated the elimination of an incentive rather than the addition of an incentive, which may not have
symmetric effects given past research showing that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
14
Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) and Conley and Taber (2011) do not find statistically significant estimates
of the effect of grants on college enrollment. We focus on the Dynarski (2003) results as a potentially overly
optimistic view of the effect of educational subsidies.
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the sample would enroll in college. If the state provided vouchers proportional to the expected
years of study, 5,664 students would enroll, with 3,766 in four-year colleges and 1,898 in twoyear colleges. According to the working paper version of the article, the vouchers provide $5,367
per student at a four-year college and $2,683 per student at a two-year college. The total voucher
expenditure would therefore be (3,766*$5,367+1,898*$2,683)=$25.3 million. The educational
vouchers therefore increased college enrollment by just (5,664–5,535)/25,300,000*1,000 =
0.0051 students per thousand dollars spent.
Two studies of tax incentives for college enrollment examining the Hope, Lifetime
Learning, and American Opportunity Tax Credits estimate that these produce no measurable
increases in college attendance (Long, 2004b; Bulman & Hoxby, 2015).
Increasing Energy Conservation
Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, and Griskevicius (2007) and Allcott and Rogers
(2014) considered the effects of nudging households to reduce electricity consumption by
sending them letters comparing their energy use to that of their neighbors. This intervention
harnesses both competitiveness and the power of social norms. Allcott and Rogers (2014)
directed readers to Allcott (2011) for simpler cost effectiveness calculations for the program. We
focus on the Allcott (2011) calculations for this reason and because they are based on much
larger sample sizes than the Schultz et al. (2007) analysis. Allcott (2011) found that the program
averaged $0.0367 ($0.0331 in 2009 dollars) of expenditure for each kWh of electricity saved
over the course of approximately two years, or saved 27.3 kWh per dollar spent.15
Asensio and Delmas (2015) studied a nudge that strategically framed information
provided to households from meters recording appliance-level electricity usage. Giving

15

Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) report similar results.
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households access to a webpage with this information along with messages linking pollution
from electricity usage to health and environmental issues, perhaps sparking moral concerns
(Haidt, 2001), reduced electricity consumption by 8.192 percent, or (0.0819*8.66*100)=70.9
kWh over the 100 day treatment period relative to the control group, which had baseline average
electricity usage of 8.66 kWh per day. We assume energy savings decayed linearly over one
year, translating to 149.8 kWh saved in total per household. The authors report (via private
correspondence) that the cost of the treatment was $3,019 per household. The intervention thus
saved an unremarkable 0.050 kWh per dollar spent. The authors also tested an alternative nudge
providing information on electricity usage and messages linking usage to increased utility bills,
seeking to increase the salience of the pain of paying (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998), and they did
not find a statistically significant effect on electricity consumption.16
In the category of economic incentives, when California utilities offered residential
customers a 20% rebate off of their summer electricity bills in 2005 if they reduced usage by at
least 20% relative to the previous year’s summer total, energy consumption during the summer
decreased by 60.5 million kWh. Ito (2015) calculates that the program spent 29.3 cents (24.1
cents in 2005 levels) for each kWh saved, and it therefore saved 3.41 kWh per dollar spent.
Arimura, Li, Newell, and Palmer (2012) estimated the effect of demand-side management
and energy efficiency policies, which combined education and incentives, using data from 307
U.S. utilities from 1992-2006. They found that the programs, which operate over the course of
several years, spent on average $0.071 ($0.050 in 1999 dollars) per kWh saved, and they saved
an impressive 14.0 kWh per dollar spent.

16

Sexton (2015) demonstrated that withdrawing consumers from automatic electricity bill payment programs
significantly reduced energy usage. This intervention does not fit into any of the traditional policy categories we
evaluate; it comes closest to being a nudge. We exclude it from our analysis because it imposes significant
transaction costs on consumers and therefore is not truly a nudge.
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Increasing Adult Outpatient Influenza Vaccinations
Milkman et al. (2011) studied a nudge prompting people to plan the date and time when
they would obtain an influenza vaccination. Such prompts embed intentions more firmly in
memory and associate cues like the intended time of action with the intended behavior, thereby
reducing forgetfulness. They also help people think through logistical hurdles and strategies for
overcoming those hurdles. Finally, they create a commitment that is uncomfortable to break
(Rogers, Milkman, John, & Norton, 2015). The authors found that planning prompts increased
flu shot take-up by 4.2 percentage points. Adding the prompts to reminder letters that were
already being mailed required 5 hours of labor at a cost of $75 per hour in 2011 dollars, totaling
$415.58 in 2015 dollars. With 1,270 employees receiving the prompts, the intervention generated
(0.042*1,270)/415.58*100=12.8 additional vaccinations per $100 spent.
Chapman et al. (2010) studied the effect of opt-out appointments (a nudge) on
vaccination rates. As explained in the discussion of automatic savings plan enrollment, defaults
capitalize on inertia, inferences about recommendations, and loss aversion. In the treatment
group, individuals were automatically scheduled for vaccination appointments, while individuals
in the control group were only given a web link to schedule their own appointments. In both
conditions, participants were not penalized for missing appointments, and they could walk into
the clinic without an appointment. The opt-out treatment increased the vaccination rate by 11.7
percentage points over the opt-in control. In follow-up correspondence, one of the authors
estimated that a clinic faces a cost of $1.25 for each request to change (cancel/add/reschedule) an
appointment, a cost of $5 to add staff for each extra appointment, and a cost of $30 for stocking
each extra unused vaccine. In the opt-out group, 39 people changed or cancelled appointments.
In the opt-in group, 50 people scheduled appointments (none were changed or cancelled).
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We assume that a clinic must provide enough staff to cover the number of people who
have appointments or the number of people who keep their appointment plus the number of
walk-ins, whichever is greater, for a total of 221 appointments for the opt-out group and 80
appointments and walk-ins for the opt-in group. We also assume that clinics accurately anticipate
the proportion of people who keep their automatic appointments, making the number of vaccines
that expire negligible. The opt-out condition then has a total cost of
($1.25*39+$5*221)=$1,153.75 in 2009 dollars, while the opt-in condition has a total cost of
($1.25*50+$5*80)=$462.50 in 2009 dollars, so the inflation-adjusted marginal cost of the optout condition is $766.06. Given that 239 people were in the treatment group, the opt-out nudge
generated (0.117*239)/766.06*100=3.65 additional vaccinations per hundred dollars spent.
As for price-based policies, Bronchetti, Huffman, and Magnenheim (2015) found that
offering a $30 incentive ($31.07 in 2015 dollars) increased vaccination rates at campus clinics by
10.7 percentage points. The baseline vaccination rate in the control group was 8.7%, so the
treatment generated just 0.107/(31.07*(0.107+0.087))*100=1.78 additional vaccinations per
hundred dollars spent.
Kimura, Nguyen, Higa, Hurwitz, and Vugia (2007) examined the effect of education and
free workplace vaccination clinics. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to their
findings, we calculate that the educational campaign increased vaccination rates by 8.19
percentage points, while free vaccinations increased vaccination rates by 15.3 percentage points.
The authors estimated that an educational campaign for 100 employees costs $92.54, while free
vaccinations cost $1,427.77. The educational and free vaccination treatments therefore generated
an impressive (8.19/92.54)*100=8.85 and a less remarkable (15.3/1,427.77)*100=1.07 additional
vaccinations per hundred dollars spent, respectively.
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Table 2.
Panel A. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting retirement savings.
Authors
Carroll et al.
(2009)

Treatment
New employees at a company were required
to indicate their preferred contribution rate
in a workplace retirement savings plan
within their first month of employment

Impact
$200 increase in
savings plan
contributions per
employeea

Chetty et al.
(2014)

The Danish government changed the tax
deduction for contributions to one type of
pension account for the roughly 20% of
earners who were in the top tax bracket
Monetary inducements were offered to
employees of a large university for attending a
benefits fair where they would receive
information about the retirement savings plan
Clients preparing a tax return at offices in lowand middle-income neighborhoods in St. Louis
were offered 20%, 50%, or no matching
contributions for the first $1000 of additional
contributions to a retirement savings account

$540 (27) change in
contributions to the
affected pension account
per person affected
$58.95 increase in
savings plan
contributions per
employeea
20% match: $93.6 (9.0)
in incremental
contributions per person;
50% match: $244.5
(12.8) in incremental
contributions per person
$11.6 (1.00) increase in
retirement account
contributions per person

Cost
$2 per employee for
distributing form and
for following up with
employees who did not
respond
$195 change in
government revenue per
person affected

Relative effectiveness
$100 increase in
savings plan
contributions per $1
spenta

$2.77 (0.14) change in
contributions to the
affected pension account
per $1 spent
Duflo and
$4.04 per employee for
$14.58 increase in
Saez (2003)
monetary inducements
savings plan
contributions per $1
spenta
20% match: $5.59 (0.54)
20% match: $16.7 in
Duflo et al.
increase in contributions
matching dollars per
(2006)
per $1 spent;
person;
50% match: $2.97 (0.16)
50% match: $82.4 in
increase in contributions
matching dollars per
per $1 spent
person
Duflo et al.
The U.S. federal government increased the tax
$9.35 increase in tax
$1.24 (0.11) increase in
(2007)
credit on the first $2000 of retirement savings
credits per person
retirement account
from 20% to 50% when adjusted gross income
contributions per $1
dropped below a threshold
spent
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention.
a
For this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported.
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Table 2 continued.
Panel B. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting college enrollment.
Authors
Bettinger et
al. (2012)

Treatment
Tax professionals offered to help lowincome families fill out financial aid forms
and calculate potential aid amounts at the
time of tax preparation

Impact
8.1 (3.5) percentage
point increase in
likelihood of attending
college the next year

Dynarski
(2003)

The Social Security Student Benefit Program
gave out monthly stipends to young adults
enrolled in college with a parent who was
eligible for benefits as a federal postsecondary educational subsidy until the 1980s
Some states offered state education subsidies
for students attending their in-state public
universities

18.2 (9.6) percentage
point change in
likelihood of attending
college

Long (2004a)

2.3 percent increase in
number of students
attending college (5,535
to 5,664 students)a,b
Negligible effect

Cost
$53.02 per participant
for training and pay of
tax professionals,
materials, software,
and call center support
$5,181 per eligible
person for stipends

Relative effectiveness
1.53 (0.66) additional
students enrolled in
college within the next
year per $1,000 spent

$4,468 per college
student ($25.3 million
total) for subsidiesb

0.0051 additional
students enrolled in
college per $1,000 spenta

0.0351 (0.0185)
additional students
enrolled in college per
$1,000 spent

Long
The federal government offered the Hope,
Negligible effect
(2004b);
Lifetime Learning, and American Opportunity
Bulman and
Tax Credits to subsidize spending on higher
Hoxby (2015) education
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention.
a
For this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported.
b
It was not possible to calculate a figure that is strictly comparable to the other figures in the same column.

SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INVEST MORE IN NUDGING?

21

Table 2 continued.
Panel C. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting energy conservation.
Authors
Allcott
(2011)

Treatment
An independent company sent reports to
residential consumers that contained both
comparisons to neighbors’ electricity usage
and tips for conservation
Researchers granted residential consumers
access to a website sharing their detailed
appliance-level electricity usage
information, with messages either linking
this usage to health and environmental
issues or to increased utility bills

Impact
2.0 percent reduction
in energy usage on
averagea

Cost
Approximately $1 per
report, with reports
sent monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly
$3,019 per household

Relative effectiveness
27.3 kWh saved per $1
spenta

Health/environmental
Health/environmental
messages: 0.050 (0.026)
messages: 8.192 (4.306)
kWh saved per $1
percent reduction in
spent;
energy usage;
Billing-oriented
Billing-oriented
messages: negligible
messages: negligible
effect
effect
Ito (2015)
Residents in California received discounts on
4.2 (1.3) percent
$3.70 per customer for
3.41 kWh saved per $1
their electricity bills if they reduced their
reduction in energy
rebates plus $1.39 per
spenta
summer energy usage by at least 20% relative
usage in inland areas
customer for
to the previous summer
and negligible effect in
administrative and
coastal areas
marketing costs
$10.83 per customer on
14.0 kWh saved per $1
Arimura et al. Utilities provided incentives and education to
0.9 (0.5) percent
average
spenta
(2012)
reduce energy usage during peak times and
reduction in energy
promote efficiency investments
usage during
intervention period and
1.8 (1.1) percent
reduction when
including effects in
future periods
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention.
a
For this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported.
Asensio and
Delmas
(2015)
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Table 2 continued.
Panel D. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting influenza vaccination.
Authors
Milkman et
al. (2011)

Chapman et
al. (2010)

Treatment
An employer modified the normal
informational mailings regarding free flu
shot clinics to prompt employees to write
down details about when they planned to
obtain vaccinations
A university automatically assigned its
faculty and staff to (non-mandatory) flu
shot appointment times
Experimenters paid college students a $30
incentive to get a flu shot at the campus clinic

Impact
4.2 (1.9) percentage
point increase in flu
shot take-up

Cost
$0.33 per employee for
adding planning
prompts to reminder
letters

Relative effectiveness
12.8 (5.8) additional
people vaccinated per
$100 spent

11.7 (4.5) percentage
$3.21 per person for
3.65 (1.40) additional
point increase in flu
excess (unutilized)
people vaccinated per
shot take-up
clinic capacity
$100 spent
Bronchetti et
10.7 (0.9) percentage
$6.03 per eligible
1.78 (0.15) additional
al. (2015)
point increase in flu shot student for incentive
people vaccinated per
take-up
$100 spent
Education: 8.85
Education: 8.19
Education: $0.93 per
Kimura et al. Conducted an educational campaign on the
additional people
percentage point
employee
(2007)
benefits of influenza vaccination;
vaccinated per $100
increase in flu shot takea
spenta
up
Free vaccines: $14.28
Provided free onsite influenza vaccines
Free vaccines: 15.3
Free vaccines: 1.07
per employee
percentage point
additional people
increase in flu shot takevaccinated per $100
upa
spenta
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention.
a
For this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported.
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Relative effectiveness of interventions in four domains.
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programs or some combination the two)
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Discussion
The contribution of this paper is to extract critical new information from past work by
calculating comparable relative effectiveness numbers and examining them side by side to
illustrate how different interventions measure up on this important dimension. The results hardly
provide an exhaustive review of the relative effectiveness of nudges compared to traditional
policy tools, such as bans and incentives. Nonetheless, our selective but systematic calculations
indicate that the impact of nudges is often greater, on a cost-adjusted basis, than that of
traditional tools.
In which situations are nudges more impactful per dollar spent than traditional policy
tools and vice versa (Goldin and Lawson, 2016)? Far more work needs to be done on this
question (ibid.), but monetary incentives may well do better, along that dimension, when the
policy maker’s objective is to correct a misalignment between the public interest and the private
interests of citizens making carefully reasoned decisions (as in cases where private decisions
impose externalities). To be sure, nudges can help even there, and sometimes they may be
preferable (Sunstein and Reisch, 2014). But their comparative advantages will typically be
greater when the policy maker’s objective is to change the day-to-day behavior of individuals
who are making biased, rushed, or otherwise imperfect decisions. As seen in Table 2, monetary
incentives in these settings can generate large increases in desirable behavior, but are sometimes
too expensive to generate a favorable ratio of impact to cost. Because traditional interventions
seek to change behavior by altering the cost-benefit calculation that individuals undertake when
focusing on a particular decision, these interventions face the challenge that individuals’ ability
(and desire) to engage high-level cognitive capacities is often limited (Shah, Mullainathan, &
Shafir, 2012). Nudges, by contrast, can succeed by taking account of individuals’ intuitions,
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emotions, and automatic decision-making processes. These processes can be triggered with
simple cues and subtle changes to the choice environment, so nudges can be effective yet cheap,
generating high impact per dollar spent.
Should nudges therefore replace traditional policy tools? Sometimes, but we warn against
jumping to this conclusion. Nudges cannot be the only tool for pursuing policy objectives. In
many cases, nudges make it easier for individuals to take advantage of policies that are already in
place. For example, the retirement savings active decision nudge directed greater attention to an
existing savings plan; the FAFSA intervention increased college attendance by simplifying the
process of applying for student aid programs; and the vaccination planning prompts helped
individuals to focus on how they could follow through on the intention to attend an existing free
workplace clinic. Savings plan automatic enrollment and default flu shot appointments required
no up-front effort on the part of individuals, but nonetheless started them down the path of
engaging with existing savings plans and free vaccination clinics, respectively.
An important caveat to our calculations is that they are not apples-to-apples exercises:
they compare the effectiveness of different interventions without holding fixed the population
studied. We lack sufficient studies comparing multiple policy interventions simultaneously
across similar populations. It would also be desirable to examine additional consequences of
interventions beyond their effects on the narrow behavior targeted (e.g., costs incurred by
individuals as they react to the interventions; see Allcott and Kessler, 2015). Importantly, the
operational philosophy of nudging is to test competing behavioral interventions and then to cull
ineffective ones from the portfolio of nudges. This rapid testing cycle—along with the low cost
of deploying most nudges in the first place—increases the likelihood that failures will be
inexpensive.
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Conclusion
We offer three recommendations. First, there should be increased investment in
behaviorally-informed policies to supplement traditional policies both inside and outside of
governments. Second, nudge units and others enlisting nudges should share data and knowledge
(e.g., through a central repository) and coordinate efforts to maximize their learning from one
another. Tracking failures is as important for knowledge creation as tracking successes. Third,
behavioral scientists should measure relative effectiveness explicitly in their studies in order to
quantify the impact of nudge interventions compared to other available policy tools (and to learn
which nudge interventions work best). Nudging has entered government in the U.K., in the U.S.,
and far beyond, but in light of growing evidence of its relative effectiveness, we believe that
policymakers should nudge more.
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